We are bidden to discuss the patient's 'right'. We therefore begin with a word of common currency in the law. But the only rights known to the lawyer are those which the law recognizes by condemning the wrongdoer and compensating the party wronged. There exists no legal right without its corresponding legal duty, for when a man claims something as his right, he claims it as something due to him. I therefore propose to consider whether a doctor is under any legal duty to tell his patients the truth about their condition. Putting the matter in that broad way, with one solitary exception to be mentioned later, I know ofnojudicial authority for the general proposition that he is. And I have heard of no case in which a doctor has sued or could have been sued for failing to tell a patient the truth about himself. Equally, I have never heard of the converse case of a doctor being sued because he did tell his patient the truth.
The reason for this dearth of authority is not far to seek. A doctor may be sued by his patient either for breach of contract or for negligence or for both; but he will not be the loser unless the patient proves that he suffered damage as a result of the doctor's breach. This necessity can create difficulties even in straightforward medicolegal cases based on negligent treatment. But to establish that a patient has been injured in person or pocket simply by the withholding of the truth is indeed a daunting task.
Let us, however, assume that the patient can somehow prove that damage flowed from his medical adviser's failure to tell him the truth. He still has to establish that by his omission the doctor failed in his legal duty. Does the duty exist? For the sake of prudence, I hasten to stress that of course, I now speak extrajudicially and, were I hereafter called upon to consider the prob-lem in judicial proceedings, I should regard myself as wholly unfettered by anything I say tonight. Having provided myself with that escape clause, I answer the question by saying: 'In general, no such legal duty exists. ' Particular circumstances may, however, create a duty. For example, I may make clear to my doctor that I am consulting him about my condition because I contemplate making certain property dispositions, or giving directions to my lawyer dependent on his diagnosis. In this way I may confront my doctor with a cruel dilemma. But, having made my position clear to him, it is up to him to decide whether or not to act as my adviser. If he does, he is legally obliged to tell me the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Accordingly, if he says that in his opinion I am good for quite a few years when he knows in fact that I am in a very bad way, and if, relying on his diagnosis, I take steps which I would not otherwise have taken, he is liable to compensate me or my estate for any consequential damage. And in those special circumstances it would afford him no defence to say that he was doing what he thought was best for me.
Again, if a patient contemplates bringing legal proceedings for personal injuries, the decision whether to sue at all, or, having started the action, whether to pursue it to finality or to settle it, may well turn upon the plaintiff's present condition, as compared with his condition before his accident. His lawyer is there to advise him, but nevertheless the ultimate decision is that of the injured party himself. He therefore has a legal right to be told by his doctor what the true position is, so that he can view the problem in an informed manner. If the doctor conceals the truth from him he breaches his legal duty and would be liable if, as a result, the plaintiff fared worse in his litigation than he would had the truth been told.
There are cases, too, where the doctor or surgeon acts unlawfully unless he does so with the patient's consent. Since there can be no true consent without knowledge, there must in those cases be no withholding the truth, whether the patient has specifically asked for it or not. We must consider that aspect of our topic a little later.
But, apart from such special circumstances, I do not think that the law recognizes any obligation in the doctor to tell the truth. Indeed, it has been known to withhold condemnation even when the doctor told his patient a lie. In a case tried in 1954 (Hatchard v. Black; see British Medical Journal 1954) a doctor diagnosed a toxic goitre; he discussed with the patient the alternative treatments of an operation or a course of drugs. He pointed out that drugs would take a long time. The patient then chose the operation. As a result. her left recurrent laryngeal nerve was injured and her left vocal cord paralysed. The patient sued both doctor and surgeon. She alleged that the doctor had advised her that the operation involved no risk to her voice and that the surgeon had operated negligently. The doctor denied having told the patient that no risk was involved, but the surgeon admitted that he had told her just that. The case was tried with a jury and this is what Denning, L.J. said to them when he summed up:
'What should a doctor tell a patient? (The surgeon) has admitted that on the evening before the operation he told (the plaintiff) that there was no risk to her voice when he knew that there was some slight risk; but that he did it for her own good because it was of vital importance that she should not worry ... He told a lie, but he did it because in the circumstances it was justifiable ... The law does not condemn the doctor when he only does what a wise doctor so placed would do. And none of the doctors called as witnesses have suggested that (the surgeon) was wrong. All agreed that it was a matter for his own judgment. If they do not condemn him, why should you? It is for you to say whether you think that (the doctor) told her that there was no risk whatever, or he may have prevaricated to put her off, as many a good doctor would, rather than worry her. But even if you think he did tell her, is that a cause for censure?'
And, having heard that, the jury returned verdicts in favour of both defendants. I wonder whether your stillness while I quoted those words was due to your respect for a great Judge and Christian gentleman, or whether you have simply been reduced to stunned silence. At least some of you, I feel sure, will take the opposite view. I recall that in a lecture to surgeons Mr Rodney Smith (1969) said that they must never lie, adding:
'Although we may edit the truth in the sense that favourable aspects are discussed at more length than the unfavourable, we should answer a patient's questions with the truth and never with a lie. The fact that his surgeon has lied almost invariably at some stage becomes clear to the patient and from then onwards the chances of helping him have gone.' But Lord Denning was dealing with the law, and what the law requires is no more (and no less) than reasonable care and skill in the treatment of each particular patient. Beyond that, it refuses to generalize, and this for what we regard as good reasons. For just as the medicine a doctor prescribes and the surgeon advises will vary with each patient, so will the extent to which the doctor lifts the veil. At the threshold there arises the question: What patient and what truth? To tell the truth to some may be brutal, despite their entreaties; to withhold it from others may be a massive mistake. In deciding what is the proper course in the particular case lies the art of medicine. And what was a right decision six months ago may be wrong today, for the fearful patient of earlier days may have acquired an inner tranquillity enabling him to bear with fortitude what would formerly have left him terrorstricken.
The position is, of course, particularly difficult if the patient is dying. Whether or not there is any legal duty to warn the patient of this fact, Professor John Hinton is surely right in saying that:
'Most doctors will bear in mind how far a person needs to set his affairs in order, when considering what they should tell a dying patient. Imparting advice to a man that it might be a wise precaution to tidy up business arrangements serves more than that single function. Conveyed with tact, it is a hint that an ill man can discuss further with his doctor, if he is of a mind to know more, or it is advice he can just accept at its face value' (Hinton 1967) .
But one legal right in relation to truth the patient most assuredly possesses. It is that his medical adviser will take all proper steps to learn for himself what the truth is about his patient. This, at least, he must do, whether or not he then proceeds to impart it; and if he fails to do it he is both morally wrong and legally liable for any harm which befalls the patient as a result.
Let me now say a few words about the one case I know of where in this country a doctor was held legally liable for failing to tell his patient the truth (Gerber v. Pines, 1935, 79 Sol. J. 13). In the course of a hypodermic injection for rheumatism the needle broke and part remained in the patient's body. The doctor was unable to get it out and it remained there until removed by operation five days later. In an action brought by the patient, Mr Justice du Parcq held that no lack of skill had been established, but he said that the other question to be decided was whether the doctor should have told the patient at once what had happened. The Judge said that, though there were exceptions, as a general rule a patient in whose body a doctor knew he had left some foreign substance was entitled to be told at once. In the particular case he held that there was a breach of duty amounting to negligence in not at once informing the plaintiff or her husband on the day of the accident what had happened. But the Judge considered that in the circumstances the damages must be very small and he awarded the plaintiff five guineas.
That decision is, as I have said, a lone ranger in our law. And in Ireland they declined to follow it in another broken needle case (Daniels v. Heskin, 1953, Ir.L.T.189). Mr Justice Kingsmill-Moore there said: 'I cannot admit any abstract duty to tell patients what is the matter with them or, to particularize, to say that a needle has been left in their tissue. All depends on the circumstances, the character of the patient, her health ... the nature of the tissue in which the needle is embedded, the possibility of subsequent infection or other danger, the arrangements which are being made for future observation and care, and innumerable other considerations.'
There remain to be dealt with those cases where the lawyer joins with the priest in holding that truth must out, although according to Holy Writ, 'He that hatir knowledge spareth his words' (Proverbs xvii.27). These cases have a common link. They are cases in which the plaintiff's consent is necessary before a proposed course of medical or surgical treatment is embarked upon. In such circumstances he must be adequately informed of what is involved, for if the truth is withheld the layman is in no proper position to give his consent. What the doctor must tell him will vary with the circumstances, but a distinguished Australian doctor put the matter with helpful clarity. He said:
'When the patient's condition is diagnosed, he needs to be told three things, in words that he can understand. He needs to be told what is wrong with him, what it may possibly mean in the future, and what medical science has to offer him. If these three things are advanced carefully, the patient can make some reasonable arrangements and may also bring his usual defences to the situation at whatever level he finds necessary' (Elland 1968) .
A surgical operation is lawful only with the consent of the person operated upon, otherwise the surgeon risks being sued for assault. Indeed, one legal writer expresses the view that he might open himself to a criminal charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 12th edn, para. 88), but I must not be taken necessarily to accept the correctness of that alarming statement. Even if the patient consents to an exploratory operation, the surgeon has no defence if he performs a major one, except in an unforeseeable emergency requiring an immediate decision in order to save life or prevent grave injury to health. And the necessity for consent is not in principle confined to surgical operations. It extends to every other form of medical treatment, for it is technically an assault even to administer a drug secretly and against the patient's wishes". But there are few reported cases in this country, owing to the wise practice of surgeons here to demand of their patients written authorization of any necessary treatment.
In transplant cases the donor is to be regarded as one of the two patients involvedthough never, one hopes, of the same surgeon. However eager the donor is to play out his self-sacrificial role, the surgeon is under a legal duty to make clear to him the risks involved, both in the operation itself and in the resultant impairment of his corpus. He may not want the truth, but in this case the truth must be forced upon him. A man may declare himself ready to die for another, but the surgeon must never take him at his word. For in general, as Lord Devlin (1962) has said, 'The Good Samaritan is a character unesteemed in English law'. And the patient must be capable of comprehending the truth when it is told him. If mentally debilitated, his consent is worthless. And a risk is also involved if the would-be donor is a minor.
Then what of patients who are in no fit condition to comprehend the truth even were it told them, and who are therefore incapable of giving or withholding their consent? What, for example, is to be done in a dire emergency such as calls for an organ transplant to the badly injured? I know of no reported decision in this country, but I think I do know what would happen if a surgeon operated with proper skill upon such a patient who later sued him for assault simply because he had not consented to become a transplant donee. I predict that the patient would lose, though I decline to prophesy tonight what the precise ratio decidendi would be. For the present I am content to adopt the words of the Canadian Chief Justice who said: 'I think it is better ... to put consent altogether out of the case where a great emergency which could not be anticipated arises, and to rule that it is the surgeon's "See a case reported in the British MedicalJournal (1949) . But contrast the Canadian decision in Male v. 1-opmans (1967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 105, where a patient with an injured knee gave his consent to general treatment for it. The doctor, fearing infection or even fatal results, decided without first obtaining the patient's specific consent to use a drug with known possible side-effects.
He failed to carry out the recommended tests to discover whether such side-effects were happening, and the patient in fact suffered immediately from them. It was held that, having obtained incipient consent to general treatment, the doctor had used his discretion prcfperly in deciding to use the drug without first obtaining the patient's specific consent, but was negligent in omitting the recommended known tests 7 535 duty to act in order to save the life or preserve the health of the patient; and that in the honest execution of that duty he should not be exposed to legal liability' (Chisholm, C J in Marshall v. Curry, 1933, 3 D.L.R. 260) . And there I must stop. But not in the arid terms of a lawyer. Let me instead leave you with the memorable words of an American physician (Henderson 1935) . Writing on the issue of truth, he said: 'Far older than the precept, "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth", is another that originates within our profession, that has always been the guide of the best physicians, and, if I may venture a prophecy, will always remain so. So far as possible, "do no harm". You can do harm by the process that is quaintly called telling the truth. You can do harm by lying ... It will arise also from what you say and what you fail to say. But try to do as little harm as possible, not only in treatment with drugs, or with the knife, but also in treatment with words, with the expression of your sentiments and emotions. Try at all times to act upon the patient so as to modify his sentiments to his own advantage, and remember that, to this end, nothing is more effective than arousing in him the belief that you are concerned whole-heartedly and exclusively for his welfare.' If a doctor fits his actions to these words, his patient can have no cause for complaint and the doctor need fear neither the law nor his own conscience, whatever be the truth told or withheld.
The Right Reverend Dr J A T Robinson (Trinity College, Cambridge)
I would like to speak about two recent experiences which I regard as perfectly normal incidents, not the sort of borderline cases for which exceptions obviously have to be made. They have brought this issue home to me in a way that I find disturbing.
The first relates to two of the most devoted, articulate and sensitive people I know. The husband has recently died of cancer and I have been in fairly close contact with the wife. She was strongly and persistently urged not to tell her husband what was wrong, or that he had only a few months to live. I found this case very disturbing because even when one telephoned one never knew what one could say until she had gone to another room, and it seemed to me that for the whole of the last six months that couple was condemned to living a lie, that they were simply unable to communicate at any deep level. This resulted from a sort of collusion between the doctor, the wife and the patient which I found extraordinarily difficult to accept. I know that she did, too, but she was absolutely convinced that she must follow what the doctor said and realized that this was being done with the best possible motive, for the sake of the patient. It is when one finds oneself caught up in an agonizing choice like this that one begins to ask oneself who is protecting whom, who is deceiving whom?
Once you have started on such a course of action it is even more difficult to back-track. Can it really be right, apart from really exceptional circumstances? Certainly my wife and I both feel that if either of us found ourselves in this position we just could not go along with it. It does deprive the patient of the right to be treated as a whole moral human being and, above all, of a right to a prepared death, which is not simply a question of setting one's affairs in order. It is a question of a moral and spiritual relationship, which we all have to face, and which none of us can slough off on to anyone else.
The second instance was when I was taken the other day by a parish priest to see one of his most dedicated and intelligent laymen, also a very convinced Christian. He was a PhD research chemist working in industry and his wife was a nurse. He was recovering from a brain operation which had revealed that he had an inoperable growth. He was firmly convinced that it was simply a cyst and that he was getting better. One had to admire the marvellous courage of both partners but again what worried me was that it was quite palpably based on a pretence. Again I took away the sense almost of outrage and indecency that the parish priest, a friend of his at Cambridge and myself, who had seen him once, all knew and he did not. This seems morally an intolerable situation. After all, it is-his tiuth, and in a sense we have no right to have this truth and to talk about it among ourselves behind his back. Above all, if this deception was discovered, and it seems almost impossible that in the long run it would not be, then all trust is irrevocably destroyed. It may be well meant but it does seem, again, that it is preventing a person from being a full, moral, responsible human being. I feel that, whatever the legal situation, morally the doctor owes the patient the truth because basically it is his truth. Having said that, one has
